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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

COMMON CAUSE, a District of
Columbia, non-profit corporation and MARJORIE J. THOMAS,
an individual,
Plaintiffs and
Respondents,
vs.
UTAH PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
and MILLY 0. BERNARD, OLOF E.
ZUNDEL and KENNETH RIGTRUP, in
their capacities as Commissioners of the PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION OF UTAH,

Appeal No. 15685

Defendants and
Appellants,
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY,
Defendant-Intervenor
and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
COMMON CAUSE and
MARJORIE J. THOMAS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action for declaratory judgment brought by the
plaintiffs-respondents seeking a judicial determination of a single
issue, to-wit:

Whether or not the Utah Open & Public Meetings Act'

is applicable to the Utah Public Service Commission when the
Commission deliberates, votes upon, establishes, or otherwise
evaluates existing or proposed utility rates.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
In October, 1977, plaintiff-respondents Marjorie Thomas,
individually and for and on behalf of Utah Common Cause, a citizens interest group (hereinafter sometimes collectively referred
to as "COMJ."!ON CAUSE") filed suit against the Utah Public Service
Commission and the individual Commissioners (hereinafter sometimes collectively referred to as the "COMMISSION")

(R. 2).

In

November, 1977, Mountain Fuel Supply Company (hereinafter referred
to as "MOUNTAIN FUEL") moved and, pursuant to stipulation, was
granted leave to intervene as a party defendant.

(R.

85).

All

parties thereafter moved for summary judgment, entered into a
stipulated pretrial order and argued their respective motions on
December 19, 1977.

In January, 1978, the court entered its order

granting the motion of COMMON CAUSE and denying the motions of
MOUNTAIN FUEL and

~f

the COMMISSION and judgment accordingly was

entered declarlng that the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act app1ie
to and governs those meetings of the Utah Public Service Commissior.
wherein that body deliberates, votes upon, establishes or otherwise evaluates existing or proposed public utility rates.
146; 150-151).

(R. 145-

An appeal was subsequently brought both by MOUNTAI'

FUEL and by the COMMISSION.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents request that this Court affirm the declaratory
judgment entered by the trial court.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case was tried and judgment entered in favor of
COMMON CAUSE upon stipulated facts.

COMMON CAUSE generally

agrees with the statement of facts as set forth by the COMMISSION
as the same is substantially consistent with the stipulated factual record.

MOUNTAIN FUEL, however, has chosen to embellish and

enlarge upon the factual record upon which this suit was originally
tried and yet, in so doing, omits several relevant and germain
facts.

Accordingly, COMMON CAUSE is compelled to set forth its own

statement of facts which is based primarily upon the stipulated factual record before the lower court.
1.

The Public Service Commission.

The Constitution of the

State of Utah empowers the legislature to supervise and regulate
1/
public utilities operating within the state.
The legislature has
delegated its rate making powers to the Public Service Commission,
2/
an agency of the Department of Business Regulation.
The rates
charged to consumers by every public utility operating within Utah
3/
must be filed with the Commission and open to public inspection.

4/
No rate other than as on file may be charged to any consumer.

Rate

schedules may not be changed absent formal application to the
5/
Commission and an express finding by the Commission that the change

6/
is justified.

When an application for a rate increase is made, the

7/

Commission schedules a hearing concerning the propriety thereor.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

R. 89
Utah Code
Utah Code
Utah Code
Utah Code
Utah Code
Utah Code

Ann.
Ann.
Ann.
Ann.
Ann.
Ann.

§§ 54-4-1, et seq. (Repl. Vol. 6A, 1974)
§ 54-3-2 (Repl. Vol. 6A, 1974)
§ 54-3-7 (Repl. Vol. 6A, 1974)
§ 54-3-3 (Rep1. Vol. 6A, 1974)
§ 54-7-12(1) (Rep1. Vol. 6A, 1974)
§ 54-7-12(2) (Rep1. Vol. 6A, 1974)
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After providing all interested parties a full and fair opportunity to be heard in support of their respective positions, the
Commission either grants or denies the requested increase or es-

8/

tablishes a new rate in lieu of that requested~

Any new rate is

thereafter the authorized rate unless modified upon rehearing by

9/
the Commission or set aside by the Supreme Court as an abuse of
10/
the Commission's authorit~
With respect to the authority and procedure of the
Commission, MOUNTAIN FUEL and the COMMISSION have stipulated to
the following:
1.

That the legislature is vested with the power and

authority to set and determine utility rates.
2.

Commissioners

89).

That such legislative power and authority has been

delegated by the legislature to the COMMISSION.
3.

(R.

Tha~

(R.

89).

i£ called as witnesses, the three individual

WO'-'-'-'-' ':2S":i£y tnat they hold administrative hearings

concerning the propriety and reasonableness of utility rates and
that upon the conclusion of such administrative hearings they convene in private for the purpose of deliberating, evaluating, votins
or otherwise acting upon public utility rates.
4.

(R.

89).

That if COMMON CAUSE requested permission from the

COMMISSION, or any of the Commissioners thereof, to attend any of
said private sessions, such request would be denied.

8.
9.
10.

(R.

91).

Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-4 (Repl. Vol. 6A, 1974)
Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15 (Repl. Vol. 6A, 1974)
Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-16 (Repl. Vol. 6A, 1974)
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2.

The Utah Open and Public Meetings Act.

In February,

1977, the Utah Legislature enacted the Utah Open and Public Meet11/
ings Act (hereafter "Act"). The Act requires all "public bodies"
to meet openly before the public in the exercise of all functions
entrusted to them, subject to specific exceptions enumerated with12/
in the Act itself which are not herein relevant. This openness
requirement was enacted pursuant to the legislature's explicit
finding and declaration that,
• . . the state, its agencies and political subdivisions, exist to aid in the conduct of the
people's business.
It is the intent of the law
that their actions be taken openly and that
their deliberations be conducted openly. Utah
Code Ann. § 52-4-1 (1977 Supp.) (emphasis
added).
Despite passage of the Act, the COMMISSION has continued
to conduct its ratemaking deliberations in secret and has made no
attempt to comply with the procedures set forth in the Act for
closing a meeting.

This policy of deliberating in secret has re-

ceived the express approval of the Utah Attorney General who issued
a formal opinion to the effect that deliberations of the COMMISSION
13/
were impliedly exempt from the requirements of the Ac~
The
Legislative General Counsel, however, has formally issued a con-

lY

trary opinion.

11.
12.
13.
14.

Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.
R. 255-260
R. 251-254

§§ 52-4-1, et seq. (1977 Supp.)
§ 52-4-3 (1977 Supp.); R. 91
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with respect to the application of the Open Meetings Act
to the proceedings of the COMMISSION, both appellants stipulated
as follows:
1.

The closed sessions held by the COMMISSION wherein

they deliberate ratemaking matters are "meetings" as that term is
defined in the Act.
2.

The COMMISSION is a "public body" as that term is

defined in the Act.
3.

(R. 89).

(R. 89).

That none of the statutory exceptions to the appli·

cation of the openness requirements of the Act are relevant or
applicable to this case.

3.

(R.

91).

Ruling of the Lower Court.

On January 4, 1978, the

trial court entered its memorandum decision granting the motion of
COMMON CAUSE for

summa~r

the COMMISSION and

judgment and denying similar motions of

"!OUYT.~. =i\i

FUEL.

(R. 141-143).

Judgment was en-

tered on January 24, 1978, and provides in pertinent part as foll01>
1. That the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act,
Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-1 et seq. (1977 Supp.), applies
to and governs the meetings of the Utah Public Service Commission wherein that public body deliberates,
votes upon, establishes, or otherwise evaluates existing or proposed public utility rates, tolls, charges,
rentals or classifications. The Utah Open and Public
Meetings Act requires the Public Service Commission
to exercise these legislatively delegated rate making
powers in proceedings open to the public unless such
meetings are closed by the Commission pursuant to
§§ 52-4-4 and 52-4-5 of the Act.
(R. 146) .·
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ARGUMENT
I

THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION
TO DECIDE THE PRESENT CONTROVERSY
The COMMISSION acknowledges that the district court had
jurisdiction to decide the present controversy.

(R. 89.)

However,

MOUNTAIN FUEL has argued that Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-16 (Repl. Vol.
6A, 1974) divests the district court of jurisdiction.

This argu-

ment completely ignores the Administrative Rule Making Act which
clearly and expressly grants the district court jurisdiction to
determine the validity of administrative agency policy.

Further,

MOUNTAIN FUEL's argument erroneously interprets § 54-7-16 to apply
across the board to any conduct or action of the COMMISSION.

As

the following section demonstrates, § 54-7-16 applies only to orders
made by the COMMISSION pursuant to the regulation of a utility.

It

does not have application to the COMMISSION's deliberative procedure
or its interpretation of the application of the Open Meetings Act.
1.

The Administrative Rule Making Act Expressly Authorizes

The District Court to Determine The Validity Of Any Procedure Used

By The COMMISSION.

The Administrative Rule Making Act, Utah Code

Ann. § 63-46-1, et seq.

(1953), specifies the procedure to be followed

by agencies in promulgating the rules and regulations which govern
their operation.

It applies to all state agencies unless specifi-

cally exempted by the Act and provides that all other provisions of
law which are inconsistent or in conflict with the Act are expressly repealed.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Utah Code Ann.

§

63-46-2 (Repl. Vol. 7A, 1978).

A rule is defined under the Act as every statement of general applicability adopted by the agency that:
. . . implements or interprets the law or prescribes the policy of the agency in the administration of its functions or describes the organization, procedure or practice requirements
of any agency . . . Utah Code Ann. § 63-46-3(4)
(1953).
Once a rule is adopted by the agency under the Act, a party affecte:
by the rule's application can challenge the validity of it in district court:
The validity or applicability of a rule may be
determined in an action for declaratory judgment
in any district court of this state (subject to
the venue statute), if it is alleged that the
rule, or its threatened application, interferes
with or impairs, or threatens to interfere with
or impair, the legal rights or privileges of the
plaintiff. The agency shall be made a party to
the action. A declaratory judgment may be rendered w~e~her or not the plaintiff has requested
the ~ge~~ .. ~o ?ass upon the validity or applicabillty of the rule in question. . . Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46-9 (Repl. Vol. 7A, 1978) (emphasis added).
The record in this case demonstrates that the COMMISSION
is a state administrative agency which has the delegated power to
regulate utilities and set utility rates.

(R. 89).

When the

COMMISSION deliberates and votes upon the setting of utility rates,
it prohibits the public from attending (R. 89).

Clearly this

practice is a policy used by the COMMISSION in deliberating on
utility rates.

It is, therefore, an administrative rule and the

District Court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of it.
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2.

Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-16

(1953) Does Not Divest The

District Court Of Jurisdiction.
MOUNTAIN FUEL argues that Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-16
divests the district court of jurisdiction.
§

(1953)

To fully understand

54-7-16 it is necessary to examine the purpose and nature of the

COMMISSION.

The Utah State Constitution empowers the legislature

to supervise and regulate public utilities operating within the
state.

The legislature in turn delegated its rate making function

to the COMMISSION.

The sole purpose of the COMMISSION is to per-

form the legislative function of supervising and regulating utilities.

Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-1 (Repl. Vol. 6A, 1974).
The COMMISSION is vested with limited jurisdiction because

its knowledge and expertise is presumed limited to utility regulation.

Lewis v. Wycoff Co., 18 Utah 2d 255, 420 P.2d 117 (1966).

The COMMISSION does not have jurisdiction to perform a judicial
function or make a judicial determination, Union Pac. RR. Co. v.
Public Service Cornrn., 103 Utah 459, 135 P.2d 915.

(1943).

The reason for the COMMISSION's lack of jurisdiction to perform judicial functions is obvious.

Judicial determinations are

the function of the courts, not an administrative agency with delegated legislative powers.

The COMMISSION does not have presumed

knowledge and expertise in judicial matters and must defer its
judgment to the courts.

Similarly, the courts must defer judgment

to the COMMISSION on utility matters.

The Utah Supreme Court em-

phasized this basic principle in Union Pac. RR. Co. v. Public
Service Cornrn., supra:
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. . . unless some justifiable question arises,
unless some point is judicially present, this
court will not substitute its judgment for
that of an administrative tribunal [Public
Service Commission] charged by law with carrying out matters of a nonjudicial character.
103 Utah at 466.
(emphasis added)
In the present case, COMMON CAUSE is not challenging a
written order or decision of the COMMISSION which sets a rate or
regulates a utility.

COMMON CAUSE is challenging a practice, a

"rule" of the COMMISSION which violates state law.
of holding private deliberations is not an order.

The practice
It is clearly
I

an unwritten practice adopted by the COMMISSION which reflects its!
administrative policy in rate setting deliberations.
§

54-7-16

Consequently,'

has no application to this case.
MOUNTAIN FUEL's argument creates a situation where an ad-

ministrative agency. with delegated legislative functions, is trans
formed into a judlclal :;gency with the power to interpret state law
of generaly applicability.

Surely the legislature did not intend

the COMMISSION to have such jurisdiction.

The determination of

general state law and its application to particular administrative:
agencies is singularly for the courts, not the COMMISSION.
Finally, if the COMMISSION's practice of holding private
deliberations is an "order," as MOUNTAIN FUEL suggests, there is
a conflict between the Administrative Rule Making Act, which allows
declaratory judgments in district court, and the provisions of
§

54-7-16 which prohibit them.

Even if, by some tortured con-

struction, an unwritten practice by the COMMISSION was considered
an "order,"

§

54-7-16 would be repealed insofar as it was incon-

sistent with or in conflict with the Administrative Rule Making Ac:
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This act shall be applicable to every agency of
the state of Utah except as specifically exempted
by this act. All other provis~ons ot law, to the
extent they are inconsistent or in conflict with
this act are repealed and superseded by this act.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46-2 (Repl. Vol. 7A, 1978) (emphasis added).
The Public Utilities Act was originally passed in 1917, and was
amended in 1933 and 1943.

The Administrative Rule Making Act was

passed in 1973 and superseded and repealed all other provisions of
law inconsistent with it.

Therefore, even if § 54-7-16 did apply

to COMMISSION rules, it has been repealed by the Administrative Rule
Making Act, and COMMON CAUSE properly sought a declaratory judgment
in district court.

II
COMMON CAUSE WAS NOT REQUIRED TO
APPEAR BEFORE THE COMMISSION AS
A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO THIS
LITIGATION
As the preceding section demonstrates, the Administrative
Rule Making Act gives the district court jurisdiction to determine
the validity of any rule or practice adopted by the COMMISSION in
the discharge of its rate making functions.

The Act not only vests

the district court with jurisdiction, but it clearly provides that
administrative remedies need not be exhausted before resorting to
litigation:
The validity or applicability of a rule may
be determined in an action for declaratory
judgment in any district court of this state
The agency shall be made a party to
the action. A declaratory judgment may be
rendered whether or not the plaintiff has
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requested the agency to pass upon the
validity or applicability of the rule
in question; . . . Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46-9 (Repl. Vol. 7A, 1978) (emphasis
added).
COMMON CAUSE is challenging the rule adopted by the COMMISSION to
hold private rate making deliberations.
§

By express provision of

63-46-9 of the Administrative Rule Making Act, COMMON CAUSE has

standing to assert that challenge in district court without exhausting their administrative remedies.
Further, even if the Administrative Rule Making Act did
not eliminate the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies,
it is clear that a party need not perform a useless or futile act
before the COMMISSION:
Where it appears that a resort to statutory
adminlstrative remedies would be clearly
futile, then a declaratory judgment action
in the nat~=e of an equitable proceeding,
may bE ~esorted to, since equity does not
require the doing of a useless thing.
A
court of equity in these circumstances can
furnish an appropriate remedy, and the
litigant ought not to be compelled to
speculate upon the chances of obtaining
relief by resort to the so-called administrative remedies. Anderson, Actions for
Declaratory Judgments, § 201 (2d ed. 1951).
The COMMISSION and MOUNTAIN FUEL stipulated that if COMMON CAUSE
sought to attend any of the secret deliberative sessions challenged
herein such request would be denied.

(R. 91) .

Since COMMON

CAUSE would be performing a useless and futile act in presenting
this matter to the COMMISSION, it clearly has no obligation to do
so as a condition precedent to litigation.
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III
THE COMMISSION, IN PROMULGATING
RATES, IS A LEGISLATIVE BODY
AND IS SUBJECT TO THE OPENNESS
REQUIREMENTS OF THE ACT

The Utah Open and Public Meetings Act applies to all meetings
of a public body.

The legislature, with unusual clarity, defined

a public body as:
. . . any administrative, advisory, executive
or legislative body of the state . . . which
consists of two or more persons that expends,
disburses or is supported in whole or in part
by tax revenue and which is invested with the
authority to make decisions regarding the
public's business . • .
Utah Code Ann.
§ 52-4-2 (2) (1977 Supp.).
(emphasis added).
All parties have stipulated that the COMMISSION is a "public body"
and is covered by the Act.

(R. 89, 90).

The COMMISSION acts as

a public body when i t establishes rates because, as this Court has
repeatedly announced and as the trial court found,

the power to fix

and regulate rates is inherently a legislative function delegated
by the legislature to the COMMISSION.
Light & Traction,

Salt Lake City v. Utah

52 Utah 210, 173 P. 556

(1918); U.S. Smelting,

Refining and Milling Co. v. Utah Power & Light, 58 Utah 168, 196
P.

902

(1921); Utah Copper Co. v. Public Utilities Comm., 59 Utah

191, 203 P. 727

(1921); Logan City v. Public Utilities Comm., 72

Utah 63,

961

271 P.

(1928).

Rate regulation by the public utilities commission was
first challenged in Utah as an unconstitutional impairment of a
public utility's freedom to contract.

This Court rejected that

argument in Salt Lake City v. Utah Light & Traction, 52 Utah 210,
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173 P. 556, 559 (1918), finding that the Public Utilities Act was
constitutional because rate regulation was a permissible legislative function:
In other words, it is universally held that
the regulation and fixing of rates is a
governmental function, that is, a legislative function
This holding was challenged in U.S. Smelting, Refining and
co. v. Utah Power & Light, 58 Utah 168, 196 P. 902

Millin~

(1921).

How-

ever, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that rate regulation is an inherent legislative power:
It has been held repeatedly, both by the
Supreme Court of the United States and the
courts of last resort of many of the states,
including this court, that the regulation
of rates for public utilities is a governmental function corning directly within the
police power of the state . . . 197 P. at
907-908.
The legislature's power to regulate public utility rates
was attacked again in Utah Copper Co. v. Public Utilities Cornrn.,
59 Utah 191, 203 P. 727 (1921), where petitioner claimed that the
COMMISSION had no authority to impose a temporary rate after find·
ing that a permanent rate was discriminatory.

The Supreme Court,

again, succinctly stated the basis and derivation of the
COMMISSION's authority:
Fundamentally, the legislative or police
power to regulate the public utilities of
the state and fix rates rests upon the
legal right to secure to the consuming public, just, uniform and equitable rates, as
applied to the service rendered.
203 P.
at 631
Having also been asked to review the reasonableness of the tempcrary rate imposed by the COMMISSION, the court properly found
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that the judiciary had no such power:
The power conferred upon the legislature
is supreme respecting the regulation and
establishing of rates (citing Salt Lake
City v. Utah Light & Traction, supra.).

* * *

It will be seen from the foregoing that this
court stands committed to the doctrine that
our Utilities Commission is purely an administrative body, clothed by the legislature
with the power to regulate the public utilities of this state, and that we, as a court,
have no r~ght to ~nterfere with the functioning of the Commission until it clearly appears
that the rates as established by it are manifestly unjust or confiscatory in their nature.
203 P. at 634. (emphasis added).
If Utah Copper Co. v. Public Utilities Comm., supra., left
open any question as to whether the legislature's inherent power
to regulate public utility rates could be delegated to the Public
Utilities Commission, that question was affirmatively answered in
Logan City v. Public Utilities Comm., 72 Utah 563, 271 P. 961, 970
(1928) :
That in the absence of constitutional restruction, the legislature may in the exercise of its police power fix or determine
rates and charges of public utilities doing
business within the state, or delegate the
power to do so, and within limitations and
restrictions regulate and control their
service, is well settled.
Rarely is case authority so consistent and clear.

The power

of the state to regulate public utility rates is an inherent police
power, legislative in nature.
Traction, supra.;

u.s.

Salt Lake City v. Utah Light &

Smelting, Refining and Milling Co. v. Utah

Power & Light, supra.; Utah Copper Co. v. Public Utilities Comm.,
supra.

This power may be delegated by the legislature to the Public
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d

service Commission.

Utah Co~ Co. v. Public Utilities Comm.,

supra.; Logan City v. Public Utilities Comm., supra.

Since the

Public Service Commission was created by legislature for the express purpose of performing the legislature's function of regulating rates and activities of public utilities, the COMMISSION's
deliberations in rate making proceedings are expressly subject to
the openness requirements of the Act.

Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-2(2)

(1977 Supp.).

IV
THERE IS NO IMPLIED EXEMPTION
TO THE OPEN MEETINGS ACT
In an effort to avoid the clear application of the Act to
the COMMISSION's rate making deliberations, the COMMISSION and
MOUNTAIN FUEL

;~a,;e

:ievoc.ed the bulk of their argument to creating

an exemption which the legislature failed to specify.

The apparent

thrust of appellants' argument is that, despite the COMMISSION's
admitted legislative purpose, the COMMISSION acts judicially in
establishing rates and is, therefore, exempted from the requirements of the Act.
reasons.

This argument is without

merit for three

First, as this Court has clearly indicated, the COMMISSI:'

is constitutionally prohibited from exercising and does not exercise any judicial power.

Second, in promulgating rates and

charges, the COMMISSION exercises no "quasi-judicial" power.
Finally, even if the COMMISSION's deliberations were painted as
being quasi-judicial, the Act remains applicable.
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1.

The Commission is Constitutionally Prohibited From

Performing and Does Not Perform Judicial Functions.
Constitution of the State of Utah, art.

v,

The

§ 1, provides as

follows:
The powers of the government of the State
of Utah shall be divided into three distinct
departments, the Legislative, the Executive
and the Judicial; and no person charged with
the exercise of powers properly belonging to
one of these departments, shall exercise any
functions appertaining to either of the
others, except in the cases herein expressly
directed or permitted.
Specifically with respect to the exercise of judicial powers, the
Utah Constitution, art. VIII, § 1, states:
The Judicial power of the State shall be
vested in the Senate sitting as a court of
impeachment, and a Supreme Court, in
district courts, in justices of the peace,
and such other bodies inferior to the Supreme
Court as may be established by law.
To accept appellants' argument that the COMMISSION, a legislative
body, exercises judicial powers in establishing public utility
rates, is to acknowledge an unconstitutional invasion of separation
of powers by the COMMISSION.

The constitutionality of the legis-

lature's delegation of rate making authority to the COMMISSION has
been settled for well over 70 years.

Salt Lake City v. Utah Light

& Traction, supra.
2.

In Setting and Establishing Rates, The Commission

Exercises No Quasi-Judicial Power.

Appellants' argument that the

COMMISSION exercises judicial-like powers in promulgating rates was
squarely disposed of by this Court in Jeremy Fuel & Grain Co. v.
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Public Utilities Comm., 63 Utah 392, 226 P. 456

(1924), where it

was held that the COMMISSION, as an arm of the legislature exercises no judicial function in fixing or promulgating rates.
In Jeremy Fuel & Grain, supra., the Court was asked toreview a COMMISSION order denying petitioner relief on a claim that
it had been overcharged by a public utility.

Relying upon Salt

Lake City v. Utah Light & Traction, supra., this Court emphasized
that it had limited review of COMMISSION rate setting because of
the legislative character of that function.

The Court wrote:

In arriving at a proper conclusion in this
proceeding it is of the upmost importance
that we keep in mind that the Commission in
fixing or promulgating rates or charges for
services rendered by the public utilities of
this state acts merely as an arm of the legislature and that in discharging its duties the
Commlssion cannot, and does not, exercise
jud~cial functions.
226 P. at 458 (emphasis
added;.

* * *

The fixing of rates is a legislative and not
a judicial function.
226 P. at 456 (emphasis
added) .
Jeremy Fuel & Grain Co. should put to rest appellants' argument tha
rate making deliberations are, in any manner, a judicial-like proceeding.
Subsequent decisions of this Court elaborated further on
the nature of COMMISSION rate setting and emphasized that rate
making decisions are not judicial in nature or consequence.

Not

only are the deliberations by the COMMISSION legislative, but this
Court has ruled that the decision rendered is legislative in
effect.

In Mulcahy v. Public Service Comm., 101 Utah 245, 117
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P. 2d 298

(1941), a trucking company sought a certificate of

authority from the COMMISSION to operate along a route already
served by petitioner railroad company and was refused.

One year

later the trucking company again applied for identical authority,
which was granted.

In this original action in the Supreme Court,

petitioner railroad company argued that the COMMISSION's earlier
findings against the trucking company must be applied as res
judicata to bar the new application.

Absent new evidence to

support the application, which the record did not contain, the
railroad company urged that the COr1MISSION had abused its authority.
In resolving this issue, the Court stated that the doctrine
of res judicata applies only to "judicial decisions and not to
legislative, executive or administerial decisions."
302.

117 P.2d at

The Court recognized, however, that a legislative, executive

or ministerial body, in the exercise of its authorized powers, could
in some cases render a decision "judicial in its legal consequences
and effects" as to which res judicata would apply.

However, it

found that decisions by the COMMISSION were not such a case and
were legislative decisions not judicial decisions.

117 P.2d at 302.

Justice Larson, writing for the majority, silenced appellants' claim
that the procedures followed in reaching a decision were relevant
to a determination of the nature of the decision, saying:
The measuring rod, the test to be applied in
determining this question, is not to be
found in the mechanics of the proceeding.
The mere fact that hearings are had, evidence
taken, and decisions rendered thereon, does
not make the decision a judicial one. 117
P.2d at 302 (emphasis added).
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After a painstaking analysis of the function of the COMMISSION, th,
court properly concluded that no judicial function had been exercised:
The inquiry, as advanced and set forth by both
the truck company and the railroads, was addressed to the discretion of the Commission
for its determination of matters pertaining
primarily to the needs and conveniences of
the public, and not to rights theretofore
vested in, or obligations theretofore
assumed or imposed upon either of the parties
before the court in this action, or their
privies.
If as a result of the investigation
the commission granted any certificate it
would be for the relief of the public inconvenience and needs, and not for relief from
any infringements upon the rights of the
party to whom the certificate was granted.
It is evident, therefore, that there was no
legal controversy, no controversy at law, to
call into operation the exercise of the judi=ial function or power, and the findings or
=onclusions made would, therefore, not be a
judiclal determination or judgment, and hence
not =es a~·udicata.
117 P.2d at 304.
Explicit ln Mulcahy is the Court's recognition that a decision, judicial in nature, purports to settle finally an issue or
legal controversy.

A decision rendered by the COMMISSION on a rat'

increase application does not purport finally to settle anything.
If a requested increase is rejected, nothing can stop a public
utility from immediately filing a new request.

Under Mulcahy, a

utility's second presentation is in no way hindered or
the rejection of its prior application.

affected~

This process can and does

continue ad infinitum with no degree of finality.
MOUNTAIN FUEL's effort to discredit Mulcahy by arguing tha:
the majority of the Supreme Court failed to agree upon the ratioM:
advanced by COMMON CAUSE is without merit.

(Br.

31-33).

The
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majority of the Court concurred in the result set out above.

In

that regard, Justice Wolfe, upon whose opinion MOUNTAIN FUEL places
great emphasis, said:
But as a regulatory tribunal designed to further positive public ends, the commission's
powers are predominantly legislative in
character, and such judicial functions as it
exercises are largely incident to the proper
performance of its legislative duties. 117
P.2d at 307 (emphasis in original).

* * *

It is not required that we determine whether
the Commission was exercising an executive,
legislative or judicial function. All we
need to determine at this time is that it
was not exercising a judicial funct~on, construed as that term is in reference to courts
and thus that res adjudicata is not applicable.
I place my concurrence in regard to this phase
of the case on that proposition. 117 P.2d at
309.
The opinions of this Court are consistent and clear.

In rate

matters, the COMMISSION performs only non-judicial functions.
MOUNTAIN FUEL responds that other jurisdictions classify
rate making as quasi-judicial.

This is highly misleading.

MOUNTAIN

FUEL suggests, at page 29, that the general rule is reflected in 1
Arn.Jur. 2d., Administrative Law§ 181 (1962) and quotes at length
from that source to support its position that rate making is quasijudicial.

However, appellants fail to continue the citation through

the next two consecutive paragraphs:
In determining the reasonableness of an existing rate and awarding reparations for exaction
of an unreasonable rate, an administrative
agency acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial
capacity, and in declaring what rate shall be
a reasonable one for the future, the agency
acts in a legislative or administrative
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capacity. Awarding reparati~n for the past and
fixing rates for the future ~nvolves a determination of matters essentially different:
one
is in its nature private, made by the agency
in its quasi-judicial capacity to measure past
injuries sustained by a private shipper; the
other is public, made by the agency in its
quasi-legislative capacity to prevent future
injury to the public.
Prescribing division of rates is a legislative
and not a judicial function.
l Arn.Jur. 2d,
Administrative Law § 181 (1962). (emphasis
added; citations omitted).
The "general rule" urged by MOUNTAIN FUEL coincides with the consistent findings of the Utah Supreme Court:

Promulgation of rates

in the public interest does not call into play an exercise of
judicial like functions.
3.

Even lf the Commission's Rate Making Procedures Were

Painted as Beirog Qc:asl-JI.ldicial, the Act Remains Applicable.

As

Justice Wolfe stated in Mulcahy, supra., and as MOUNTAIN FUEL urges
at Br. 26:
He indeed is to be congratulated who can pick
out the legislative, the executive, and the
judicial ingredients of many completed administrative processes.
117 P.2d at 307.
It is precisely for this reason that the Utah Open and Public Meet·
ings Act is applicable to designated bodies, irrespective of the
process utilized by the body to accomplish its objective.

Appel-

lants, in essence, urge this Court to ignore every general principle of statutory construction in manufacturing the implied exemption so strenuously sought.
It is well-recognized that a statute is open to constructi:
only where the language used therein is ambiguous.

Where no
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ambiguity appears, it is presumed conclusively that the clear and
explicit terms of the statute express the legislative intention.
U.S. v. American Trucking Ass'n., 310

u.s.

534 (1940); In re

Stevens Estate, 102 Utah 255, 130 P.2d 85 (1942).

As succinctly

stated by this Court in State v. Archuletta, 526 P.2d 911 (1974),
"there is nothing to construe where there is no ambiguity in the
statute."

The Utah Open and Public Meetings Act is clear- it

applies to all bodies within the executive and legislative branch
whenever they meet to discuss, deliberate or act upon a matter
within their jurisdiction.
Even if an ambiguity were shown by appellants to exist, it
should be noted that a statute carries with it a presumption that
it is valid and that its words and definitions were chosen advisedly
to express the legislative intent.

Gourd v. Salt Lake City, 20 Utah

2d 138, 434 P.2d 449 (1967); Grant v. Utah State Land Board, 26 Utah
2d 198, 485 P.2d 1035 (1971).

Thus, the fact that the legislature

chose to couch application of the Act in terms of bodies and not
proceedings is entitled to great weight.

There is nothing in the

Act to indicate the legislature intended an inquiry be made into
what proceeding is utilized by a public body in determining

the

applicability of the Act.
In effect, defendants request this court to manufacture an
exemption where none exists.
proper.

Such judicial legislation is im-

As stated by this Court in Mountain States Telephone and

Telegraph co. v. Public Service Comm., 107 Utah 502, 155 P.2d 184
(1945):
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An interpretation of a statute must be based
on the language used, and courts have no
power to rewrite a statute to make it conform
to an intention not expressed in that statute.
Finally, in arguing their case for judicial legislation,
MOUNTAIN FUEL attempts to avail itself of the doctrine of inclusic
unius exclusio alterius, arguing that since judicial bodies are n:
listed in the Act they are impliedly excluded as quasi-judicial
bodies

(Br. 22).

Such a doctrine, however, is utilized as an aid

in determining the intent of the legislature only where such intent is obscure or uncertain, Great Salt Lake Authority v. Island
Ranching Co., 18 Utah 2d 45, 414 P.2d 963

(1966).

The doctrine t.

no proper application when its effect would be to obstruct rather
than to ::arr:: o'"t the stated purposes of a statute.

Rio Grande

Motorway, Inc. v. Public Service Comm., 21 Utah 2d 377, 455 P.2d
(1969).

Since the intent of the Utah Legislature in enacting thE

Open Meetings Act is clear, the doctrine has no application in

t:

case.

v
APPLICATION OF THE OPEN AND PUBLIC
MEETINGS ACT TO THE COMMISSION'S
DELIBERATIONS DOES NOT RESULT IN
A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS
The COMMISSION and MOUNTAIN FUEL both assert that open
deliberations in rate setting matters would unconstitutionally
deny due process to interested parties.

This argument is one of

form rather than substance, which ignores that the object of the
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deliberations is to establish rates -an admittedly legislative
act.

Moreover, appellants have misunderstood the requirements of

due process by choosing to rely upon cases which neither discuss
the parameters of due process nor otherwise support the position
advanced.
1.

The Legislature Constitutionally May Require Legislative

Bodies, Such as the COMMISSION, to Conduct All Functions in Open
and Public Meetings.

Appellants acknowledge that the COMMISSION

is a legislatively-created body, empowered by the legislature with
legislative authority to fix and determine public utility rates.
Appellants then suggest, however, that the legislature cannot require this body to exercise all aspects of the authority which it
acquired from the legislature in public view, even though it is
uncontested that the legislature could impose such a requirement
upon itself.

The fallacy of this argument is readily apparent.

Moreover, such an argument ignores the majority holding of the only
reported decision found by COMMON CAUSE which is squarely applicable to this case.

Canney v. Board of Public Instruction of Alachua

County, 278 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1973).
A student's long hair and his suspension from high school
for violation of the school's dress code was the subject of the
Florida Supreme Court's attention in Canney.

A hearing was con-

ducted by the school board, admittedly a "body" within the requirement of openness directed by the Florida "Government in the Sunshine
Law."

At the point where a decision was to be made, the board

recessed the public meeting to make its decision in private.

The
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student challenged this closure in the state supreme court where
the board argued that the constitution required that its decision,
being "quasi-judicial" in nature, be deliberated and reached in
secret.

The precise issue for the court's determination was

whether:
. . . a county school board, acting in a quasijudicial capacity, is a part of the legislative branch of government.
If a county school
board is a part of the legislative branch, then
the Government in the Sunshine Law should be
applicable, and any exception or amendment
should be considered by the legislative, not
the judicial branch.
278 So.2d at 262.
The court expressly held that the legislature could require the
school board to deliberate in an open and public meeting without
offending constitutional due process requirements:
Once ~he legislature transforms a portion of
the board's responsibilities and duties into
tha~ ~= a judicial character, so that the
boar6 ~ay exercise quasi-judicial functions,
the prerogatives of the legislature in the
matter do not cease. The Administrative Procedure Act . . . establishes minimum requirements for the adjudication of any party's
legal rights, duties, privileges or immunities
by state agencies.
If the legislature may
delegate these quasi-judicial powers to the
school board and regulate the procedure to be
followed in hearings before the school board,
it follows as a matter of common logic that
the legislature may further require all meetings of the board at which public acts are to
be taken to be public meetings open to the
public. A board exercising quasi-judicial
functions is not a part of the judicial branch
of government.

* * *

The characterization of a decisional-making
process by a school board as "quasi-judicial"
does not make the body into a judicial body.
A county school board should not be authorized
to avoid the Government in the Sunshine Law by
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making its own determination that an act is
quasi-judicial.
Secret meetings would be
prevalent.
The correct understanding of the
terminology "quasi-judicial" means only that
the school board is acting under certain constitutional strictures which have been enforced
upon all administrative boards, and not that
the school board has become a part of the
judicial branch. To hold otherwise would be to
combine the legislative and judicial functions
of one body clearly contrary to the separation
of powers doctrine. The judiciary should not
encroach upon the legislature's right torequire that the activities of the school board
should be conducted in the "sunshine." 278
So. 2d at 263-264.
Canney is particularly persuasive when the facts there are compared
to the present case.

In Canney, it was clear that the function per-

formed by the school board was quasi-judicial while no such finding
is applicable to the COMMISSION's rate making deliberations in this
action.

In Canney, the board was asked to adjudicate the actions

of an individual, as those actions related to a specific standard of
conduct.

In this matter, there is no such adjudication and no

specific standard to govern a decision.

The COMMISSION is directed

to establish rates that are consonant with the interests of the
entire consuming public, not one individual.
2.

Even If The Rate Making Deliberations of The Commission

Were Acts of a "Judicial" Nature, Due Process Does Not Require Such
Acts to Be Performed Behind Closed Doors.

Administrative or legis-

lative proceedings of a judicial nature held behind closed doors
and shielded from public scrutiny have long been repugnant to our
system of justice.

The concept that adjudicatory hearings be open

to the public gaze is inherent in our idea of due process.

This
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view was voiced many years ago by the United States Supreme Court
in Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1

(1938), in the following

words:
The vast expansion of this field of administrative regulation in response to the pressure
of social needs is made possible under our
system by adherence to the basic principles
that the legislature shall appropriately determine the standards of administrative proceedings of a quasi-judicial character.
It does not follow that to insure a "fair and open hearing" an ad·
ministrati ve adjudicatory body must deliberate secretly.

The Utah

Supreme Court in Christiansen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314, 317

(1945),

found no such requirement:
In depriving a person of life or liberty, the
essentials of due process are: (a) the existen~e of a competent person, body, or agency
au<:::-,orized l:Jy law to determine the questions;
t;, ar inquiry into the merits of the question
by such person, body or agency; (c) notice to
the person of the inauguration and purpose of
the inquiry and the time at which such person
should appear if he wishes to be heard; (d)
right to appear in person or by counsel; (e)
fair opportunity to submit evidence, examine
and cross-examine witnesses; (f) judgment to
be rendered upon the record thus made.
In the
absence of a statute laying down other or more
specific requirements, the above conditions
meet the demands of due process.
In the absence
of specific provisions to the contrary, due
process does not require that any or all of these
requirements must be in writing or in any particular form.
(emphasis added).
The COMMISSION cannot be heard to argue that any of the elements c:
due process listed in Christiansen is inherently offended by publi:
deliberations.
Interestingly, the COMMISSION and MOUNTAIN FUEL submit the
same arguments previously advanced in the legislature by opponents
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-28-

of the Open Meetings Act.

(St. Br. 9-11; MFS Br. 36-37).

For

example, appellants assert that public scrutiny of the deliberative
process might cause the COMMISSIONERS to be intimidated and less
than candid with each other with the possible result that their decision may not be rendered upon the record made.
considered that argument and clearly rejected it.

The legislature
Reconsideration

of the merits of that argument is for the legislature, not this
Court.

As stated by this Court in Bateman v. Board of Examiners,

7 Utah 2d 221, 322 P.2d 381, 389 (1958), the courts are "not concerned with questions of policy nor with the wisdom of legislation."
However, even if the objections to the Act were considered by this
Court, an examination of the Act demonstrates that the objections
are without foundation.

For example, appellants express fear of

intimidation is squarely prevented by the Act:
This chapter shall not prohibit the removal
of any person who willfully disrupts a meeting to the extent that orderly conduct is
seriously compromised. Utah Code Ann.
§ 52-4-5 (3) (1977 Supp.).
If MOUNTAIN FUEL were ever to feel that it had suffered unjustly
before the COMMISSION, it has expedient redress in Utah Supreme
court.

This Court sits on rate making matters for the specific

purpose of determining whether a decision rendered by the COMMISSION
is supported by the record presented.

Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-16

(1953).
The picture painted by appellants of a timid and cowed
COMMISSION, bullied by public opinion, is a mirage which disappears
upon inspection.

If anything, due process is promoted by publicly-
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witnessed deliberations so that a reviewing court can more easily
determine if a decision has been reached on the basis of the recorc
made.
3.
Misplaced.

Appellants' Reliance Upon Foreign Case Authority is
Utah clearly has adopted the view that open rate makinc

deliberations are not a denial of due process.

Appellants have

represented, however, that several foreign jurisdictions have held
that open deliberations are unconstitutional.

However, of those

decisions, only one high court, the Florida Supreme Court in

~

v. Board of Public Instruction of Alachua County, supra. at p. 25
has directly confronted and decided this issue.

Their determinati:

which remains the law of Florida, falls squarely against appellant
As disclosed by t:'"Je examination which follows, those "authorities"
relied upon bJ

t~e

·~OMMISSION

and MOUNTAIN FUEL reveal only that

other jurisdictions, with dissimilar "sunshine" laws, interpret
their controlling statutes differently.

Not one of the cases

cit~

by appellants rests it conclusion upon a finding that due process
is offended by public deliberation.
A.
Decisions.

The Pollution Control and Occidental Chemical

Each appellant vociferously urges this Court to disrega.

the majority holding of Canney v. Board of Public Instruction of
Alachua County,

supra., as either not representing the weight of

authority or as being factually inapplicable to this proceeding.
(St. Br. at 15-23; MFS Br. at 41-42).

Indeed, appellant MOUNTAIN

FUEL even suggests that subsequent Florida decisions discredit
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a~c

shed doubt upon the validity of Canney's holding.

These argu-

ments are without merit.
Canney represents the first and, to date, only pronouncement by a state supreme court on the issue of whether or not the
open deliberations of a non-judicial body inherently offend constitutional guarantees of due process.

To suggest that the "weight

of authority" is against the Canney holding is without foundation.
(MFS Br. at 41).
MOUNTAIN FUEL's urging that the subsequent decisions in
Occidental Chemical Co. v. Mayo, 351 So.2d 336 (Fla. 1977), and
State Department of Pollution Control v. State Career Service Comm.,
320 So.2d 846 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1975), "significantly erode" the
Canney holding can only be perceived as a calculated effort to mislead.

(MFS Br. at 42).

In State Department of Pollution Control,

supra., a Florida district court of appeal, not the Supreme Court,
held as a matter of statutory construction that the quasi-judicial
deliberations of the Career Service Commission need not be conducted
openly.

Superficially, this lower court's decision might be viewed

as a rejection of the Canney holding.

However, the decision was not

based upon any constitutional due process consideration.

In fact,

the express holding of this lower court was repudiated in 1977 by
the Florida Supreme Court in Occidental Chemical Co. v. Mayo, supra.
In Occidental Chemical, the Florida Supreme Court was asked
to decide whether the record disclosed facts to support appellant's
claim that the commissioners of a public body had deliberated behind
closed doors.

On the basis of the record, the court concluded that
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no such deliberations had occurred.

As a matter of statutory con-

struction the court correctly held that the deliberations of the
commission's staff were not subject to the Florida Sunshine Law
because staff was not included within the act's coverage--not, as suggested by MOUNTAIN FUEL, "even though the language of
the Sunshine Act was clearly broad enough to have included such
meetings."

(MFS Br. at 43).

Significantly, the court reaffirmed

the Canney majority while repudiating State Department of Pollutic
Control:
The fact that the commission's decision
making process has been characterized as
quasi-judicial does not exempt it from
the statute.
351 So. 2d at 341, fn. 7.
(emphasis added) .
Despite

appel~ants'

remains

Vla~le

wishes to the contrary, the Canney rationale

ln Florida and is directly applicable to and per-

suasive Wlth respect to the present action.
B.

The Arizona Press Club Decision.

As it did in the

trial court, MOUNTAIN FUEL appears to rest its case upon Arizona
Press Club v. Arizona Board of Tax Appeals, 558 P.2d 697
1976).

(Ariz.

This is curious since the Arizona Press Club decision was

not based upon any constitutional consideration and arose from
facts not remotely analagous to the present case.
In Arizona Press Club, a taxpayer was dissatisfied with e
tax valuation assessed against his property by a county assessor.
Under Arizona law, the taxpayer had the option of either challenging the assessment in Superior Court or petitioning the State
Board of Tax Appeals.

The Arizona Open Meeting law provided
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generally that:
All official meetings at which any legal
action is taken by governing bodies shall
be public meetings and all persons so
desiring shall be permitted to attend and
listen to the deliberations and proceedings. A.R.S. § 38-431.01.
This broad openness requirement was tempered by numerous exceptions, including one which provided that:
The provisions of this article shall not
apply to any judicial proceedinl or any
political caucas. A.R.S. § 38- 31.08
(emphasis added) .
The taxpayer was afforded a full and open hearing.

At the

close of the evidence the board opined that its "deliberation and
decision is a judicial proceeding and, therefore, specifically exempt from the open meeting law."

558 P.2d at 698.

The board pro-

ceeded to deliberate in private and, on that ground, the taxpayer
appealed to the State Supreme Court, arguing that the "judicial
proceeding" exception to the act applied only to judicial hearings
of courts and not to quasi-judicial hearings of administrative
bodies.
The question before the State Supreme Court was whether the
tax board, when exercising its quasi-judicial power to resolve disputes between a taxpayer and a county assessor, engaged in a
"judicial proceeding."

The court expressly held that the board

acted "judicially" when hearing taxpayer appeals and concluded that
the legislature intended to exempt all judicial proceedings, whether
held by a court or an agency:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-33-

We do not believe that the legislature
intended to exempt only court judicial
proceedings and not administrative
agency judicial proceedings.
558 P.2d
at 699.
The Arizona Press Club decision is not dispositive of the
issues presented in this appeal for five separate reasons.
First, the Arizona decision resulted solely from the
court's interpretation of a statute, not from a holding that a
contrary result would violate due process guarantees.
Second, the act considered by the court is uncomparable
to the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act.

The Arizona act broadly

declared that all meetings of every governing body be open and
then qualified this broad directive with a statutory exception
for "judicial proceedings."
differently.

The Utah act is structured entirely

The Utah act takes great pains to specify those

bodies to whlch

t~e

act requirements are applicable and is not

subject to circumvention depending upon the type of proceeding in
which the body is engaged.
Third, under the standard use by the Arizona court to determine whether an agency acts "judicially", it is clear that the
deliberations of the COMMISSION would be found to be nonjudicial.
In Arizona Press Club, the taxpayer had the option of presenting
his grievance either to a court or to an administrative board.
Here, rate making matters may go only to the COMMISSION because
only the COMMISSION can exercise the legislative prerogative of
setting rates.

There is not present in this case the duality of

function argument so important to the Arizona decision.
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A related distinction between these two cases is evident
from the express purposes of the two bodies.

The Arizona Tax

Board was charged with resolving a dispute between a county
assessor, on the one hand, and a private citizen on the other,
much like a court is requested to do.

The COMMISSION, in the

course of determining rates, is not presented with such a controversy, nor is it asked to resolve any question which affects
only two singular interests.
Finally, in finding that the legislature intended to exempt the tax board from the requirements of the act, the Arizona
court reasoned that such private disputes were "not the area in
which one need fear the alleged 'private deals' and extraneous
considerations to the matter at hand.

558 P.2d at 699.

With

all due respect to our COMMISSIONERS, rate deliberations by political appointees which affect the entire public and involve millions
of consumer dollars are historically the type of activity where
the fear of private deals, payoffs and influenced decision making
is rampant.

c.

The Jordon Decision,

Each appellant argues that

Jordon v. District of Columbia, 362 A.2d 114 (D.C. 1976) stands
for the proposition that due process mandates private deliberations.

An examination of the facts warrants a contrary conclusion.

In Jordon, a police department's closed deliberation of a gun
licensing application was challenged under a "sunshine" law which
provided in total that:
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All meetings, including hearings, of any
department, agency, board or commission of
the district government, including meetings of the district council, at which
official action of any kind is taken,
shall be open to the public.
No resolution, rule, act, regulation or other
official action shall be effective unless
taken, made or enacted at such meeting.
D.C. Code§ l-1503a (1977 Supp.)
The appellate court found that the proceeding in question was adjudicatory in nature - - a "contested" case - - and hence covered
by the more directly applicable provisions of the District of
Columbia Administrative Procedure Act which did not require open
deliberations.

362 A.2d at 118.

COMMON CAUSE seriously questions how this case, and its
cited successors and progeny, are relevant or helpful to a resolution of this matter.
terrelationship

~f

The Jordon decision rested upon the in-

twc statutes, not upon constitutional analysis.

The terse statute ln question in Jordon is wholly incomparable
to the specific design and definition of the Utah Act and invited
an inquiry into legislative intent which is unnecessary in this
action.

While COMMON CAUSE disagrees with the Jordon dicta, its

applicability to the facts of this case remains a mystery.
D.

The Stillwater Savings

&

Loan Decision.

In Stillwater

Savings and Loan Assn. v. Oklahoma Savings & Loan Board, 534 P.2d
9 (Okla. 1975), a protestant appealed the board's grant of a certificate of authority on the grounds, inter alia, that the board';
failure to openly deliberate the issues violated the 1959
Open Meetings Law.

25 O.S. 1971, § 201 et seq.

Oklaho~

In its one sen-

tence dismissal of this claim, the court said:
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The "open meeting law" which was enacted
in 1959, does not include hearings before
the Oklahoma Savings and Loan Board when
it acts in a quasi-judicial manner in individual proceedings such as the present
case.
534 P.2d at ll.
Obviously, no constitutional issue was discussed.

Moreover, the

holding that quasi-judicial actions in individual proceedings were
exempted from the act does not favor appellants herein since
neither of those two announced prerequisites are present in this
action.

Finally, the specific provisions of the Oklahoma act upon

which this decision is based are not even presented by appellants
as remotely comparable to the Utah Act.

Indeed, if the 1959

Oklahoma statute were comparable to the Arizona act considered in
Arizona Press Club, supra., COMMON CAUSE would readily agree with
the court's holding but would still question its relevance.

In

any event, this decision undoubtedly will not be followed by the
State of Oklahoma since, in 1977, the statute was repealed when
Oklahoma enacted a legitimate "sunshine" law.
seq.

25 O.S. § 201, et

(1977 Supp).

E.

The School District No. 9 Decision.

The Wyoming

Supreme Court's decision in School District No. 9 v. District
Boundary Board, 351 P.2d 106 (Wyo. 1960), is likewise not controlling in the instant case as urged by the COMMISSION (Br. at 13).
In the Wyoming case, appellants, without the benefit of any open
meeting statute or rule of procedure, asserted that the private
deliberations of a district boundary board demonstrated a "fraudulent, willful, wanton and despotic attitude" of board members
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sufficient alone to set aside a ruling within the board's jurisdiction.

351 P.2d at 110.

The Wyoming court obviously ruled that

since there was no statute, charter or zoning regulation which required the board to deliberate in public, the argument advanced
by appellant was clearly without merit.
COMMON CAUSE agrees with the holding of the Wyoming court

but is at a loss to see how that decision has any relevance to
this matter.

The =ommon law may not require the COMMISSION to de-

liberate openly, which is exactly the reason the Open and Public
Meetings Act was passed.

The Wyoming court did not even suggest

that the legislature constitutionally could not require such deliberations to be conducted in public.
The distinctions that can be made between the authority
~he

cited by appellants and
material.

facts of this case are numerous and

No case urged by the COMMISSION or MOUNTAIN FUEL sup-

ports the allegation that rate making deliberations of the
COMMISSION are acts which must constitutionally be performed in
secret.

Appellants have offered no authority or reasoning which

threatens the heavy presumption of constitutionality attached to
this legislation.

Buhler v. Stone, 533 P.2d 292

(Utah 1975).

VI
UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-3-21 (4) (1953)
DOES NOT MANDATE CLOSED DELI"BERATIVE SESSIONS
Utah Code Ann.

§

54-3-21 (4)

(Repl. Vol. 6A, 1974), pro-

vides as follows:
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Hearings or proceedings of the commission
or of any commissioner shall be open to the
public, and all records of all hearings or
proceedings or orders, rules or investigations by the commission or any commissioner
shall be at all times open to the public;
provided, that any information furnished the
commission by a public utility or by any
officers, agent, employee of any public
utility may be withheld from the public whenever and during such time as the commission
may determine that it is for the best interest of the public to withhold such informat~on.
Any officer or employee of the
commission who in violation of the provisions
of this subsection divulges any such information is guilty of a misdemeanor.
(emphasis
added) .
COMMON CAUSE makes no contention, as suggested by the COMMISSION,
that the above-quoted provision was impliedly repealed nor is it
necessary to respondents' case to do so.

A careful reading of the

section reveals that the COMMISSION cannot, as the State contends,
"invoke the statute whenever it pleases in order to close any of
its deliberations."

(St. Br. p. 10).

First, the section does not

authorize closure of meetings, but only the withholding of" . .
information furnished the COMMISSION by a public utility.
Thus, the statute offers no support to the COMMISSION for closure
of its deliberative sessions nor can it support secret voting and
a refusal to review how each Commissioner votes.

In fact, the

express statutory language compels the opposite conclusion:
Hearings or proceedings of the commission
or of any commissioner shall be open to
the public, and all records of all hearings
or proceedings or orders, rules or investigations by the commission or any commissioner
shall be at all times open to the public.
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Second, the section does not grant carte blanche discretion to
the COMMISSION to withhold information at any time.

A finding by

the COMMISSION must be made that "it is for the best interest of
the public to withhold such information."

Of course, such a find-

ing must be based upon the record or reasonable belief, cannot be
arbitrarily made, and would be subject to Court review.
CONCLUSION
Attempts to circumvent the plain meaning of open and publie meeting laws are commonplace and have been met with judicial
disfavor.

As recognized by the Florida Supreme Court in Canney

v. Board of Public Instruction of Alachua County, supra., dissatisfied parties, such as defendants herein, should commit their
resources and time toward lobbying the legislature for changes in
such laws instead

c:;':_

lobbying the judiciary:

Various boards and agencies have obviously
attempted to read exceptions into the
Government in the Sunshine Law which do
not exist. Even though their intentions
may be sincere, such boards and agencies
should not be allowed to circumvent the
plain provisions of the statute.
The
benefit to the public far outweighs the
inconvenience of the board or agency.
If
the board or agency feels aggrieved, then
the remedy lies in the halls of the
Legislature and not in efforts to circumvent the plain provisions of the statute
by devious ways in the hope that the
judiciary will read some exception into
the law.
278 So.2d at 264.

-40-
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For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

ALAN E. WALCHER
Suite 318, Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Respondents COMMON
CAUSE and MARJORIE J. THOMAS
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